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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Katherine Smith appeals from the district court's summary dismissal of her post-
conviction claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the entry of her guilty 
pleas in her underlying criminal case. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
In the underlying case of State v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687, 169 P.3d 275 (Ct. App. 
2007), the Idaho Court of Appeals related the following background: 
The victim in this case owned an outdoor recreation store which 
employed Smith as an office manager. Over the course of Smith's one-
year employment, she conducted a series of illegal transactions, forgeries, 
and thefts. Smith purchased several all-terrain vehicles (A TVs) and other 
equipment using her own in-house credit account. Smith then retained the 
equipment herself or sold it under the guise of it being her property without 
paying for the equipment. Smith often deleted any record of the 
transactions from her in-house account. Smith also deposited four 
company checks into her account which she authorized by forging the 
victim's signature on each check. Finally, an audit, completed after 
Smith's termination, revealed the victim also suffered a significant cash 
shortage during Smith's employment. 
Smith was charged with ten counts of grand theft. I.C. §§ 18-
2403(1 ); 18-2407(1 )(b). Pursuant to a plea agreement, Smith pied guilty 
to three of the counts and, in exchange for the dismissal of the other 
counts, agreed to pay restitution for all charged and uncharged criminal 
conduct against the victim. Smith was released on her own recognizance. 
Smith failed to appear on the date set for sentencing after having 
absconded to Alaska. The state located Smith in Alaska and extradited 
her to Idaho. Upon her return, Smith was sentenced to two concurrent 
unified terms of ten years, with minimum periods of confinement of two 
years, and a consecutive unified term of five years, with a minimum period 
of confinement of one year. Smith filed a Rule 35 motion, which the 
district court denied. 
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kl at 690, 169 P.3d at 278. 
Smith filed a timely petition for post-conviction relief in which she asserted, 
inter a/ia, that her trial counsel provided ineffective assistance during both the 
pleading and sentencing phases of her case. (R., pp.4-111.) The state filed a 
motion for summary dismissal, asserting that Smith's claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact regarding 
both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. (R., pp.128-29, 143-55.) The 
district court provided notice of its intent to dismiss Smith's petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.161-63.) Smith responded to the district court's notice 
(R., pp.168-71 ), and the district court held a hearing on the motion for summary 
dismissal (see generally 5/29/2009 Tr.). 
Following the hearing on the state's motion, the district court dismissed all 
of the claims from Smith's post-conviction petition except for the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel as it related to sentencing. (R., pp.183-84.) 
After an evidentiary hearing on that final claim (see generally 12/21/2009 Tr.), the 
district court denied the petition (R., pp.198-205). Pursuant to the prison mailbox 
rule, Smith filed a timely notice of appeal. (R., pp.207-09; see also Motion to 
Withdraw Remittitur and Order Dismissing Appeal and Statement in Support, 
filed April 7, 2011; Order Granting Motion to Withdraw Remittitur and Order 
Dismissing Appeal, filed May 18, 2011.) 
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ISSUE 
Smith states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Ms. Smith's 
claim that her plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily 
because it was the result of ineffective assistance of counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Has Smith failed to establish error in the district court's summary dismissal of her 
post-conviction petition claim that her counsel provided ineffective assistance in relation 
to the entry of her guilty pleas? 
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ARGUMENT 
Smith Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal Of Her 
Post-Conviction Petition Claim 
A. Introduction 
The district court, following the procedures set forth in Idaho Code § 19-4906, 
summarily dismissed all but one of the claims raised in Smith's petition for post-
conviction relief. (R., pp.183-84.) Abandoning all other claims, Smith argues that the 
district court erred only in dismissing her claim that her attorney was ineffective and that 
his ineffectiveness caused her to enter a guilty plea which was not knowing, intelligent, 
or voluntary. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-14.) Smith is not entitled to a hearing on this claim 
because the alleged facts she relied on are either affirmatively disproved by the record 
or insufficient to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The 
district court therefore correctly dismissed her petition for post-conviction relief. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact exists 
based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on 
file .... " Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)). The Court freely reviews 
the district court's application of the law. Nellsch v. State, 122 Idaho 426, 434, 835 P.2d 
661, 669 (Ct. App. 1992). 
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C. The District Court Properly Dismissed Smith's Post-Conviction Claim 
Post-conviction proceedings are governed by the Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act. I.C. § 19-4901, et seq. A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a 
new and independent civil proceeding in which the petitioner bears the burden of 
establishing that he is entitled to relief. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802; 
State v. Bearshield, 104 Idaho 676, 678, 662 P.2d 548, 550 (1983). Generally, the 
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure apply to petitions for post-conviction relief. Pizzuto v. 
State, 146 Idaho 720, 724, 202 P.3d 642, 646 (2008). However, unlike other civil 
complaints, in post-conviction cases the "application must contain much more than a 
short and plain statement of the claim that would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 
8(a)(1)." Monahan v. State, 145 Idaho 872, 875, 187 P.3d 1247, 1250 (Ct. App. 2008) 
(quoting Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271, 61 P.3d 626, 628 (Ct. App. 2002)). 
Instead, the application must be supported by a statement that "specifically set[s] forth 
the grounds upon which the application is based." ~ (citing I.C. § 19-4903). "The 
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 
548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing I.C. § 19-4903). 
Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party's motion or on the court's own initiative. "To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)). Thus, a 
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claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal "if the applicant's 
evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's 
claims. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. While a court must accept a petitioner's 
unrebutted allegations as true, the court is not required to accept either the applicant's 
mere conclusory allegations, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant's 
conclusions of law. Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. 
State, 135 Idaho 797,799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 (2001)). The trial court is not required to 
conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition when the alleged facts, 
even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief. lg_,_ (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 
865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)). "Allegations contained in the application are 
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the record of 
the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law." lg_,_ 
Smith claims that her trial counsel was ineffective and caused her to enter a 
guilty plea which was not knowing, intelligent, or voluntary. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-14.) 
To present a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a post-conviction 
petitioner must allege both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 
77 4 P.2d 299, 307 (1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient 
unless it falls below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable professional 
assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P .2d 283, 286 (1986); Davis v. 
State, 116 Idaho 401, 406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). When the alleged 
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deficiency involves counsel's advice in relation to a guilty plea, "to satisfy the 'prejudice' 
requirement, the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to 
trial." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (footnote and citations omitted). 
"Moreover, to obtain relief on this type of claim, a petitioner must convince the court that 
a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." 
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S._, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485 (2010) (citing Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 (2000)). Smith failed to allege a prima facie claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel that fulfills both elements. 
Smith's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is premised on three theories of 
deficient performance, based on trial counsel's (1) informing her that her husband and 
daughter would face prosecution if she did not plead guilty (R., p.16), (2) promising that 
she would receive probation if she pied guilty (R., p.18), and (3) advising her to plead 
guilty to one or more particular counts which she thought she could contest (R., p.23). 
Most of these theories do not demonstrate deficient performance, and on each theory 
offered Smith has failed to show that she would have rationally rejected the plea 
agreement and insisted on going to trial. None of Smith's claims is sufficient to 
establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 
1. Potential Prosecution Of Family Members 
Smith argues that she was coerced into pleading guilty because her defense 
counsel informed her that if she did not plead guilty, her family would face prosecution. 
(Appellant's brief, p.11.) Assuming the truth of this allegation, Smith has not shown that 
trial counsel's actions constitute deficient performance. 
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Idaho precedent makes clear that "[a] plea of guilty is deemed coerced only 
where it is improperly induced by ignorance, fear or fraud." State v. Hanslovan, 147 
Idaho 530, 537, 211 P.3d 775, 782 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis added) (citing State v. 
§.Q!y, 127 Idaho 107, 110, 897 P.2d 1002, 1005 (Ct. App. 1995)). Where plea 
negotiations include state promises about not prosecuting loved ones, such negotiations 
are not coercive in a constitutional sense if the state acts in good faith. kl at 538, 211 
P.3d at 783 (citing Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 594-95, 861 P.2d 1253, 1259-60 (Ct. 
App. 1993)). The prosecutor acts in good faith when the state declines to prosecute a 
family member as part of a plea negotiation if that prosecution would have been 
supported by probable cause. Hanslovan, 147 Idaho at 538 n.8, 211 P3d at 783 n.8; 
Mata, 1245 Idaho at 595, 861 P.2d at 1260. 
In the underlying case, the state had a good faith basis for charging Smith's 
husband with receiving stolen property because he benefited from Smith's thefts and 
should have been aware that the property was stolen. (See Probable Cause Affidavit, 
p.5 (appended to PSI).) Because prosecutors could have filed charges against Smith's 
family members, communicating that information with the client cannot constitute 
deficient performance. Certainly Smith presented no evidence of bad faith. 
Nor has Smith shown the requisite prejudice. First, Smith has never argued that, 
but for trial counsel's actions, she would have rationally insisted on going to trial. 
Second, Smith's argument that her attorney's actions coerced her plea is affirmatively 
disproved by the record. At the change of plea hearing, Smith affirmed under oath that 
no one forced her to plead guilty and that she did so freely and voluntarily. (4/2/2004 
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Tr., p.13, L.13-18.) Having failed to show deficient performance, much less prejudice, 
this claim is properly dismissed. 
2. Promising A Particular Sentence 
Smith claimed that her attorney promised that she would receive a withheld 
judgment with three years of probation if she pied guilty. (R., p.18.) Assuming the truth 
of this allegation, the state concedes that making such a promise would likely constitute 
deficient performance. 
Smith, however, failed to establish that she was prejudiced by her attorney's 
alleged representation that she would receive probation. First, Smith has again failed to 
argue that, but for counsel's representation that she would receive probation, Smith 
would have rationally elected to go to trial. Second, Smith's claim of prejudice is 
affirmatively disproved by the record. At the plea colloquy, the district court made sure 
that Smith understood the consequences of pleading guilty, explaining: 
If you plead guilty to [Counts I, II, and Ill], you will be admitting to me you 
committed a crime. Is that what you want to do? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And you would be subjecting yourself to up to 
fourteen years on each count. You understand that? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
THE COURT: And the sentencing recommendations are open in 
this case. I don't know what your sentence will be, but you're not 
expecting me to place you on probation, are you? 
THE DEFENDANT: No. 
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THE COURT: You understand that I have a wide array of options, 
but I could sentence you to the maximum I saw fit? 
THE DEFENDANT: Yes. 
(4/2/2004 Tr., p.11, Ls.8-25 (emphasis added).) Regardless of any promises trial 
counsel may have made to Smith that she would receive probation, the district court 
made Smith aware that it was not bound to give her probation and Smith affirmatively 
represented under oath that she did not expect to receive probation. Having failed to 
establish prejudice, this claim is properly dismissed. 
3. Advising A Defendant To Follow The Plea Agreement 
Finally, Smith argues that trial counsel told her to plead guilty to contestable 
charges, inferring that he did so because he was unprepared to take the case to trial. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.12-13.) There is no factual basis to support Smith's allegation that 
her trial counsel was unprepared for trial, as the only evidence presented shows that he 
in fact reviewed both Smith's evidence and the state's evidence against her. (R., p.38.) 
Smith pied guilty pursuant to an agreement with prosecutors that, in exchange for her 
guilty pleas to three counts, the state would dismiss the remaining seven counts and 
allow Smith to be released on her own recognizance until sentencing. (See 4/2/2004 
Tr., p.4, L.19 - p.6, L.18.) Up to that point, according to Smith, she had been held on a 
$500,000 bond. (R., p.54.) 
No party ever designated which three of the ten counts Smith would plead guilty 
to (4/2/2004 Tr., p.4, Ls.22-25), so for the sake of convenience the district court 
designated Counts I, 11, and Ill, and dismissed Counts IV through X (4/2/2004 Tr., p.5, 
Ls.1-25). Smith affirmed that she understood the plea agreement and that it was her 
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intent to plead guilty to three counts in exchange for dismissal of the others. (4/2/2004 
Tr., p.6, Ls.8-18.) Later, during the taking of Smith's plea on Count II, Smith paused the 
proceedings to speak with her attorney, after which she pied guilty. (See 4/2/2004 Tr., 
p.12, L.10-p.13, L.1.) 
Smith's conversation with her attorney does not appear on the record. However, 
Smith asserted in her petition for post-conviction relief that she "stopped the judge and 
tried to ask [trial counsel) why he had me pleading guilty to charges that I have proof on 
and he told me 'that isn't revelant [sic] now, just do as I told you or you won't go home 
today.'" (R., p.23.) Assuming the truth of this allegation, it does not show deficient 
performance. Smith was pleading guilty to three counts in exchange for the dismissal of 
the remaining seven and being released on her own recognizance pending sentencing. 
(4/2/2004 Tr., p.4, L.19 - p.6, L.18.) The specific counts to which she was pleading 
guilty had been arbitrarily selected, and whether she could contest any of those 
particular counts is irrelevant when any number of the ten counts were incontestable. 
(See Probable Cause Affidavit, pp.4-6 (appended to PSI).) Furthermore, trial counsel 
was correct to inform Smith that she would not be released on her own recognizance 
unless she upheld her end of the plea agreement, because being released was 
conditioned on that agreement. 
Smith has also failed to establish prejudice. Once more she has not argued that, 
but for counsel's advice to plead guilty in exchange for the dismissal of several counts 
and being released on her own recognizance, she would have rationally rejected the 
plea agreement and gone to trial. Rejecting the plea deal in this case would not be 
rational: Smith faced ten counts of grand theft with a potential jeopardy of 140 years 
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and $50,000 in fines, in addition to restitution. I.C. § 18-2408(2)(a). Had she gone to 
trial, the evidence against her was overwhelming. (See generally Probable Cause 
Affidavit (appended to PSI).) Smith's plea agreement limited her exposure by 98 years 
in prison and $35,000 in fines, on charges where she would likely have been convicted. 
It is not rational for any defendant in similar circumstances to reject such a plea deal, 
and Smith has certainly not shown that she would have insisted on going to trial. 
In her petition for post-conviction relief, Smith failed to make out a prima facie 
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to the entry of her guilty pleas. 
The district court was correct to summarily dismiss Smith's claim, and the district court's 
order dismissing that claim should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Smith's petition for post-conviction relief. 
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2012. 
J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of May, 2012, served a true and 
correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy addressed 
to: 
DIANE M. WALKER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
c_~ 
RUSSELL J. SPENCER 
Deputy Attorney General 
RJS/pm 
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